

Study Sheet for Final Exam

Short Answers: *You'll have to answer 10 out of 15 questions for 2 points each.*

1. Explain the difference between the psychological and normative senses of the word "morality." Give examples of each usage.
2. Define "moral sensibility" and "moral ideology" and give examples of each of these phenomena.
3. Describe the moral sense hypothesis articulated and defended by Hutcheson and Hume.
4. Define "moral cognition" and explain how moral cognition is supposed to differ from prudential calculation according to those who draw a distinction between these two forms of reasoning.
5. Explain the difference between psychological altruism and evolutionary altruism, give an example of a behavior or trait that is psychologically altruistic but not evolutionary altruistic, and give an example of a behavior or trait that is evolutionarily altruistic but not psychologically altruistic.
6. Explain the moral/conventional distinction and describe one reason for thinking this distinction is not universally drawn.
7. According to O'Neill and Machery, there are several methodological problems that arise when we describe commonalities and differences between the normative systems or social rules of different groups of people. Explain two of these problems.
8. Define the "authority independence" of a rule or norm and the evidence that young children distinguish authority dependent from authority independent rules or norms.
9. Explain the difference between a purely instrumental and a non-instrumental desire and give an example of each.
10. Articulate and explicate Darwin's analysis of "conscience."
11. Explain Batson's empathy-altruism hypothesis and describe the experiment Batson uses to test this hypothesis. How does Batson propose to instill empathy in some subjects and not others?
12. Explain the distinction between the cause of a desire and the content of a desire and give an example in which the cause of a desire is largely unrelated to its content.
13. Define "self-directed desires" (either the primary or alternative definition will suffice).
14. Explain the difference between altruistic desires and moral principles.
15. State Sober and Wilson's definition of "altruism" and describe a prima facie counter-example to it.
16. Define 'incompatibilism'.
17. Define 'second-order volition' and use an example to explain what distinguishes a second-order volition from a mere second-order desire.
18. Define "psychological egoism."
19. Describe 3 out of the 5 kinds of norms Vincent, Ring and Andrews articulate. Give at least one example drawn from the studies they report of animals conforming to these three kinds of norm.
20. Define "moral subject," and "moral agent," and explain the difference between these concepts.
21. State the aversive arousal hypothesis and explain how Batson shows that it does not account for the difference in behavior between high and low empathy subjects.
22. Explain what "moral dumbfounding" is.
23. List four of Kohlberg's six stages of moral development.
24. State the principle of alternate possibilities.

25. Describe skepticism about unfree yet intentional action.
26. Explain the distinction between after-the-fact correction and up-front mental control and provide examples of each.
27. Explain the distinction between tracking reasons and responding to reasons.
28. Explain the model of moral judgment Haidt labels “social intuitionism.”
29. Define the “externalization” of a norm as this concept is introduced by Stanford and analyzed by O’Neil and Machery.
30. Explain the distinction between system 1 and system 2 cognitive processing and give an example of each.

Mandatory Essay Questions: You’ll have to **answer all 3 questions for 20 points each.**

1. Explain what a debunking argument is, what reliabilism is, and how one might try to debunk a person’s belief by showing it to have an unreliable source. Explain Joshua Greene’s neuroscientific attempt to debunk deontic moral views and the criticism of Greene’s argument articulated by Demaree-Cotton and Kahane. Is this criticism of Greene effective? According to Demaree-Cotton and Kahane which areas of the brain are operative when neurologically normal subjects make moral judgments? What are the functions neurologists assign to these areas of the brain? If you assume that Demaree-Cotton and Kahane are right about the proximate neurological causes of your moral judgments, does that increase your confidence in those judgments, decrease your confidence in their truth or leave your confidence unchanged? Explain and defend your answers.

2. Watson says,

What this difficulty shows is that the notion of orders of desires or volitions does not do the work that Frankfurt wants it to do. It does not tell us why or how a particular want can have, among all of a person’s ‘desires’ the special property of being particularly his ‘own’. There may be something to the notions of acts of identification and of decisive commitment, but these are in any case different notions from that of a second (or n-) order desire. And if these are the crucial notions, it is unclear why these acts of identification cannot be themselves of the first-order—that is, identification with or commitment to courses of action (rather than with or to desires)—in which case, no ascent is necessary, and the notion of higher-order volitions becomes superfluous or at least secondary.

What are Frankfurt’s Humean views of free will and moral responsibility? Describe Watson’s criticisms of Frankfurt’s view of free will (i.e. the criticisms given in the passage above). Are Watson’s criticisms of Frankfurt’s view devastating? Why or why not? Describe Watson’s own more Platonic view of free will. Is Watson’s view superior to Frankfurt’s? Is either view satisfying? Are there any barriers to the freedom of the will comparable to chains, cages and other obstacles to freedom of action? Do Frankfurt and Watson provide an accurate characterization of these “internal” obstacles to free choice and action? Explain your answers fully.

3. Explain the superficial problem of moral luck and the supposedly “deeper” problem of moral luck. Are these real problems? Can they be resolved? Make sure to explain the answers Nagel and Rosebury give to these questions. Which theorist is closer to the truth? Defend your assessment with an argument.

Final Essay Question: You'll have to answer 1 out of 2 of these questions for 20 points

1. Describe Frankfurt's reasons for thinking that one can be held morally responsible for an action even if one could not have acted otherwise than one actually acted. Is Frankfurt's argument against the "principle of alternative possibilities" convincing? Why or why not?

2. Describe the moral sense hypothesis advanced by Hutcheson and Hume. Describe the analysis of conscience defended by Darwin. Discuss the evidence of animal morality described by Vincent, Ring and Andrews. Does the evidence of animal morality support the claims that humans have a biologically evolved, species typical moral sense? Define "explicit norm guidance." Does the evidence suggest that humans have a biologically evolved capacity for explicit norm guidance as O'Neil and Machery maintain? How much variation exists between the moral codes of different people? How much similarity exists between these codes? Is the similarity best explained by biological commonalities? Are the differences best explained by environmental, historical or cultural differences? Support your answers with information drawn from the course readings and lecture notes.

3. Describe some of the experiments Haidt uses to argue that moral judgments are typically caused by cognitive impressions (or immediate emotional reactions) rather than reasoning (or the application of general principles). Do the experiments Haidt discusses successfully support the hypothesis that moral judgments are typically caused by intuitions rather than reasoning? Do Kennett and Fine successfully demonstrate that system 2 processes of reasoning and self-conscious control play a larger role in our moral lives than Haidt's account attributes to them? Defend your answers to these questions with arguments.

4. According to Kennett and Fine, psychopaths lack both proper affective response (moral reason-tracking capacities) and proper self-awareness and self-control (moral reason-responding capacities). According to Kennett, and Fine, those diagnosed as strongly but fairly high-functioning autistics lack robust perspective taking and normal affective responses (moral reason-tracking capacities) but can develop the proper self-awareness and self-control necessary to be guided by moral reasons. Kennett and Fine argue on this basis that autistics can be moral agents but that it is unclear whether psychopaths can be. Reconstruct and evaluate their reasoning on this issue. Is this the correct stance to take toward psychopaths and people with severe autism? Defend your answer with reasoning.