Research

Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology (for contributors)

My research is focused on the intersection of philosophy and psychology with an emphasis on moral psychology and epistemology.  I also write on and teach Scottish philosophy (mainly Hume and Bain), American philosophy (mainly James) and the history of philosophy more generally.

Moral Epistemology Database

Books

  • Moral Epistemology. Routledge, 2010
  • Belief: A Pragmatic Picture. Oxford, forthcoming

Articles

  • “Veneer Theory,” in D. Pachuca (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Moral Skepticism, forthcoming.
  • “Mikhail’s Naturalized Moral Rationalism,” Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies (2013) doi: 10.1093/jrls/jls016
  • “Introspection, Explanation and Perceptual Experience: Resisting Metaphysical Disjunctivism,” in D. Smithies and D. Stoljar (eds.) Introspection, Oxford University Press (2012), pages 353–80.
  • “Moral Skepticism,” International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Hugh LaFolette (ed), Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell (2011).
  • “Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions,” (with Josh May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Jay Hull) Review of Philosophy and Psychology (formerly European Review of Philosophy ), Special Issue: Psychology and Experimental Philosophy (Part I), Guest Editors: E. Machery, T. Lombrozo & J. Knobe, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2010), pages 265–273.
  • “A Conflict in Common Sense Moral Psychology,” Utilitas, Vol. 21, No. 4. (2009).
  • “Self-Knowledge: Rationalism v. Empiricism,” Philosophy Compass, 3⁄2 (2008), pages 325–352.
  • “Hume’s Reasons,” Hume Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2007), pages 211–256.
  • “The Nature of Belief,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 14, No. 11 (2007), pages 61–82.
  • “Against Relativism,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 133 (2007), pages 313–348
  • “Self-Verification and the Content of Thought,” Synthese, Vol. 149 (2006), pages 59–75.
  • “Putting Extrospection to Rest,” Philosophical Quarterly, 55 (October 2005), pages 658–66
  • “Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacocke’s Criticisms of Constitutivism,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 128 (2006), pages 337–379.
  • “Unnatural Access,” Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 216 (2004), pages 435–438.

Reviews

  • Review of Mark Richard’s When Truth Gives Out (Oxford University Press, 2008) for Mind (forthcoming).
  • Review of Jennifer Lackey’s Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008) for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2008).
  • Review of Paul Boghossian’s Fear of Knowledge (Clarendon Press, 2006) for Ars Disputandi, Vol. 7 (2007).
  • Review of Maria Baghramian’s Relativism (Routledge, 2004) for Ars Disputandi, Vol. 6 (2006).

Hinge Conference Handout